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Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis (GG), he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only pursue what we conceive to be good. This version of thesis seems to allow that human beings might act in defiance of reason’s directives, and that if they did so, they would not necessarily be engaging in actions that they conceive to be good in any way. In fact, Kant’s discussions of pathological motivation and his understanding of imperatives seem to preclude any stronger reading. Despite this evidence, many interpreters, relying on Kant’s discussion of self-conceit and the ‘incorporation thesis’, assume that Kant’s commitment to GG extends to all actions; on this interpretation, even immoral actions are pursued under the guise of the good. I argue that the reasoning typically provided in favor of this interpretation is neither compatible with Kant’s hedonism regarding non-moral motives nor with his commitment to the epistemic priority of our awareness of moral law over our awareness of freedom. However, the textual evidence that Kant accepted a more extensive version of GG is indeed compelling. I propose that Kant holds the stronger version of GG on distinctively moral grounds; the nature of our awareness of the moral law implies that evil is pursued under the guise of the good.

KEYWORDS

Guise of the good; Kant; moral law; incorporation thesis; evil

1. Introduction

It seems hard to deny that, on Kant’s view, when an agent’s actions are as they ought to be, then the agent is acting under the guise of the good at least in some understanding of ‘acting under the guise of the good’. Kant says this rather explicitly in a well-known passage in the Critique of Practical Reason:

There is an old formula of the schools, nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione mali; and it has a use which is often correct but also often very detrimental to philosophy, because the expressions boni and mali contain an ambiguity, owing to the poverty of the language, by which they are capable of a double sense and thus unavoidably involve practical laws in ambiguities …

The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do not allow this difference to be overlooked. For that which the Latin denominates with a single word, bonum,
it has two very different concepts and equally different expressions as well: for *bonum* it has *das Gute* and *das Wohl*, for *malum* it has *das Böse* and *das Übel*… so that there are two very different appraisals of an action depending upon whether we take into consideration the good and evil of it or our well-being and woe (ill-being). From this it already follows that the above psychological proposition is at least very doubtful if it is translated: we desire nothing except with a view to our wellbeing or woe, whereas if it is rendered: we will nothing under the direction of reason except insofar as we hold it to be good or evil, it is indubitably certain and at the same time quite clearly expressed. (Kant 1997b, 5:59–60)

The passage not only endorses a certain version of the guise of the good view, but calls it ‘indubitably certain’. Immediately before this passage in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant claims that ‘good’ (*Gute*) and ‘evil’ (*Böse*) are the only objects of practical reason, respectively the objects of desire and aversion:

> The only objects of a practical reason are therefore those of the *good* and the *evil*. For by the first is understood a necessary object of the faculty of desire, by the second, of the faculty of aversion. (5:58)

However, these passages do not amount to a clear endorsement of the view that we desire only that which we represent as good. A ‘necessary object of the faculty of desire’ is not the sole object of faculty of desire, but one which has a necessary relation to that faculty; perhaps other objects are *contingently* related to the faculty of desire and the passage does not seem to be taking a stance on these objects. On the other hand, Kant does seem to be making the stronger claim with respect to the objects of *practical reason*. According to Kant, ‘its only object’ is the good (and the evil as an object of aversion).¹ And since Kant identifies practical reason and the will,² it seems that any manifestation of my will, and thus anything like an intentional action, must be performed under the guise of the good.

Yet Kant does add the qualification ‘under the direction of reason’. And although he does say that the proposition ‘we desire nothing except with a view to our well being’ is ‘very doubtful’ when considered as a ‘psychological proposition’, he does not seem to challenge the coherence of the hypothesis. Moreover the very doubtful proposition is a universal generalization; nothing in the passage suggests that Kant denies that sometimes we desire something with a view to our well-being, rather than under the guise of the good. One could object that Kant is talking here about *desire* rather than will and agency, so even if we allow that some of the things we desire, we desire under the ‘guise of well-being’ (or as I will call it ‘the guise of the pleasant’), it would not mean that we ever act under that guise, especially if Kant’s notion of desire (*Begierde*) need not imply that we ever act directly from such a desire.

Indeed, if Kant accepts what Henry Allison calls the ‘Incorporation Thesis’ (Allison 1990, 2020), then perhaps Kant allows that we *desire* certain things under the guise of the pleasant, but in order to *act* on such a desire, we must incorporate it into a maxim, and the

¹I will henceforth treat ‘good’ as the only object of practical reason, and assume that evil can be treated as its dual; that is, to avert evil is to pursue the good of refraining from the evil action. Nothing in the argument depends on whether this assumption is correct; if it is false, we should say that *pursuit* is under the guise of the good, but agency has two irreducible manifestations: pursuit and avoidance.

²See for instance, ‘Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason’ (*Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:412).
maxim then must be willed under the guise of the good. However, things are not so simple, or so I will argue. This passage suggests that Kant is here expressing in a different manner his views about the duality of motivation: that there are two distinct basic motives of human action: the motive of duty and self-love. But if this is true, then it seems that the qualification ‘under the direction of reason’ plays a significant role: it is restricting the claim to actions that are done from the motive of duty. So the passage might leave open, if it does not downright imply, that when we act from self-love, or at least give primacy to the motive of self-love, we are not acting under the guise of the good. This would be a denial of the doctrine of the guise of the good, the old formula of the schools described in the quote above, in its full generality. In the second section of the paper, I examine the plausibility of this interpretation, and argue that it has quite a bit of textual evidence in its favor and some important philosophical motivation. In the third section, I argue that, despite its initial plausibility, an interpretation of the duality of human motivation that is committed to a corresponding ‘duality of guises’ conflicts with other parts of Kant’s texts, especially his discussion of self-conceit and evil. Finally I try to reconcile these texts and defend an interpretation of Kant that does justice to his understanding of the duality of human motivation.

My final view is that Kant does accept a very general version of the guise of the good. In acting badly, I still must represent the object of the faculty of desire as good, even if in a confused manner. On Kant’s view, we must attribute that all our actions are pursued under the guise of the good as a condition of their imputability. But part of Kant’s commitment to the inscrutability of evil turns out to be also a commitment to the inscrutability of the representation of immoral actions as good. In contrast to what is often the motivation of the Guise of the Good thesis, Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good makes immoral action less intelligible.

2. The guise of the pleasant

Throughout his ethical writing, Kant consistently takes the good to be the object of practical reason and practical cognition to be cognition of the good. Later in the Critique of Practical Reason, the highest good is described as the ‘whole object of a pure practical reason (der ganze Gegenstand einer reinen praktischen Vernunft)’ (5:109). The good is not only what pure practical reason in fact would pursue, but also how we represent our morally good actions. As Kant says immediately afterwards:

The highest good is then not merely object: the concept of it and the representation of its existence as possible by our practical reason (das höchste Gut nicht blos Object, sondern auch sein Begriff und die Vorstellung der durch unsere praktische Vernunft möglichen Existenz) are at the same time the determining ground of the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact determines the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy. (5:109–110)

3Of course, in a sense, no one should deny that sometimes we pursue our well-being. Any plausible version of the guise of good accepts that you pursue various ends, which you take to be good. But Kant seems to be presenting each disambiguation as a competing view, so it seems that ‘well-being’ would, under the very doubtful interpretation, be playing the same role as ‘good’ plays in the indubitable version.

4Or actions that properly order the incentives of self-love and morality, subordinating the former to the latter.

5For a systematic account of Kant’s understanding of practical cognition as well as its connection to the good, see Engstrom (2009).
This passage raises complex interpretative issues, but for our purposes it is enough to notice that Kant seems to be identifying the representation of the highest good with moral motivation or at least motivation by pure practical reason (by a ‘pure will’). We see the same commitment to the idea that action guided by practical reason is action guided by the good in the discussion of imperatives. Although the categorical and the hypothetical imperatives are famously formulated in terms of ‘oughts’, the conceptual connection between principles of necessitation, that is, principles governed by an ‘ought’, and the representation of the good is made explicit in many passages. So, for instance, in the *Groundwork*, we find the following passages:

Every practical law represents a possible action as good … If the action would be good merely as means to *something else*, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good itself … then it is **categorical**. (4:414)

The imperative thus says which action possible by me would be good. (4:414)

As is often pointed out, imperatives, principles that tell an agent what they *ought* to do, apply only to finitely rational agents. Arguably, in its most general form, the moral law simply represents something as good. After all, for an unlimited good will, the moral law is not formulated in terms of an ‘ought’ but is still a law that represents something as good:6

Thus a perfectly good will would just as much stand under objective laws (of the good), but it would not be represented as thereby necessitated because it can of itself … be determined only by the representation of the good. (4:414; emphasis added)

Similar claims appear, for instance, in the Collins lectures on moral philosophy. Kant claims there that each kind of imperative expresses a different ‘kind of goodness’:

The problematic imperative says something is good as means to any given end and that is *bonitas problematica*

The pragmatic imperative … says that the action is necessary as a means to our happiness … and that is *bonitas pragmatica*

The moral imperative expresses the goodness of an action in and for itself … and that is *bonitas moralis*. (Kant 1997a, 27: 255–256)

This by no means exhausts the evidence for Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good with respect to actions ‘under the direction of reason’. But these passages also raise obstacles to generalizing the claims that Kant makes about action properly guided by rational principles to intentional action more generally. After all, these very same passages seem to provide evidence **against** the claim that nonmoral or immoral action also involves the representation of its object as good. In fact, the passage above describing the ‘perfectly good will’ seems to indicate that an agent who is always determined by the representation of the good stands *in contrast* with the human agent, and exactly the cases in which the agent does not act from the moral law seem to be cases in which they

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6Of course, this is not to deny that Kant takes the determination of the moral law to be prior to the determination of the concepts of the good, and that he rejects the view that the former is grounded on the latter. This is Kant’s famous ‘paradox of the method’. For a recent discussion of the paradox of method in relation to Kant’s conception of value, see Kain (2018).
are guided by something other than a representation of the good. So just before the passage from the Collins Lecture above, we get the following claims:

Our action can … be necessitated in two ways; they can either be necessary according to laws of free choice, and then they are practically necessary or according to laws governing the inclinations of sensuous feeling, and then they are pathologically necessary … All imperatives are mere formulae of practical necessitation. (27: 355)

The quote seems to indicate that some human actions have another guiding principle, namely, the ‘laws of sensibility’ rather than the ‘laws of freedom’, and, given that these actions are not guided in any way by imperatives, they would not represent their object as good.

Similarly, in explaining the nature of imperatives, Kant says:

The imperative … represents the practical rule in relation to a will that does not do at once just because it is good, partly because the agent does not always know that is good, partly because, even if he knew this, his maxims could still be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason. (4:414; emphasis added)

Of course, the first explanation of why an imperfect agent could deviate from an imperative is fully compatible with the guise of the good thesis: not knowing what is good, I might represent something as good that is not in fact good. So if I mistakenly thought that watching ‘Battlefield Earth’ would be an enjoyable and enriching experience, it would be natural to explain why I watched the movie in these terms: from ignorance, I wrongly represented the action of watching this movie as good.

But the second alternative seems to single out cases that cannot be characterized as a similar type of mistake. In such cases I am guided by a subjective principle which I recognize to be in conflict with my representation of the good. This seems to exclude the possibility that when I am ‘pathologically necessitated’, when my actions follow these maxims opposed to the principles of practical reason, I represent my action as good.

Now various versions of the guise of the good thesis, in attempting to accommodate phenomena like akrasia, try to allow for exactly this possibility; namely, that we can act against our knowledge or belief that something is good, while at the same time still representing our action as good. However, we need further textual support to attribute such a view to Kant, as the surrounding text suggests no such view. In fact, the duality of principles here seems to be tracking the duality of motivation that appears in the Groundwork, and in the Critique of Practical Reason, between the motives of duty and self-love. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that all ‘material principles … are … one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one’s happiness’ (5:22). These principles are ‘based only on the subjective condition of receptivity to a pleasure or displeasure’, and although they can never ‘furnish a practical law’, they can ‘serve as … [a] maxim for the subject who possesses this receptivity’ (5:21–22). Most telling, in the case of actions performed from self-love, the feeling of pleasure seems to play the same role that the representation of good plays in actions done from the moral

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7For my own attempts to reconcile these possibilities see Tenenbaum (2007, 2018). As it will be clear later, I do think that Kant accepts some view like these.
motive. In such cases, choice seems to be determined by the extent to which the object pleases.8 For when one inquires about the determining grounds of desire and puts them in the agreeableness expected from something or other, it does not matter at all where the representation of this pleasing object comes from but only how much it pleases. If a representation … can determine choice only by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the subject, its being a determining ground of choice is wholly dependent upon the nature of inner sense, namely that this can be agreeably affected by the representation. However dissimilar representations of objects may be … the feeling of pleasure by which alone they properly constitute the determining ground of the will … is nevertheless of one and the same kind. (5:23)

In other words, the object of representation is pursued insofar as it is connected with the feeling of pleasure, much like an action is the object of practical reason when it is represented as good. In fact, we could go further and propose that if good is the representation of the necessary relation of an object with our faculty of desire, the pleasant is the feeling that marks a contingent relation between an object and our faculty of desire – or, closer to Kant’s words, the representation of a contingent agreement between an object and the faculty of desire. This is indeed very close to the definition of pleasure that Kant gives at the preface to the Critique of Practical Reason:

Life is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. Pleasure is the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of the causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its object. (5:9n)

A few remarks are in order. First, one might deny that the passages above imply anything about how the agent represents the object of her action; that is, even if pleasure plays a causal role in the agent’s nonmoral choices, nothing Kant says above show that the agent must represent the object under the guise of the pleasant. This is roughly in line with Andrews Reath’s seminal deflationary reading of Kant’s hedonism.9 However, this suggestion faces an immediate problem: how could pleasure play such a role in the determination of the faculty of desire, if not through the representation of the connection of the object with the feeling of pleasure? After all, the faculty of desire is the faculty to ‘cause the reality of the objects of [its] representations’ exactly ‘by means of [these] representations’. Reath argues that pleasure plays a central role in the causal genesis of the desire, but not in directly determining how the agent chooses action.10 Reath rejects a more robust version of hedonism because he assumes, roughly, that the guise of the good view also applies to the nonmoral actions. So, for instance, he says:

That an action will produce satisfaction in the agent is taken to be a reason for choosing it, which makes it good, and its contribution to one’s overall satisfaction is what one looks at in weighing it against alternatives. The principle of happiness states the general form

8Bacin (2018) argues that attributing a version of the guise of the good that extends to immoral actions ‘runs against Kant’s rejection of a continuity between sensible and intellectual faculties’ (1709). As it’ll become clearer below, I think this is an important concern, but I hope to show that Kant’s is committed both to the Guise of the Good and to the duality of motivation.
10Reath revises this view to some extent in the appendix to the reprint of the paper (Reath 2006, appendix).
underlying reasoning of this sort, and is the principle that determines what sorts of consider-
ations count as reasons within it. Moreover, someone who accepted happiness as a final aim
might cite this principle in the course of justifying certain choices to others. (Reath 2006, 45)

But the passages above put in doubt that this is the correct way of understanding the
duality of motivation. It seems that immoral action is contrasted with the actions that
we represent as good. Moreover, the passage immediately after these quoted passages
suggests that the amount of pleasure is, so to speak, the calculus by means of which
an agent chooses among various pleasant options. It is difficult to reconcile the
passage below with the idea that pleasure plays a mere causal role in the acquisition
of certain desires:

The same human being can return unread an instructive book that he cannot again obtain, in
order not to miss a hunt; he can leave in the middle of a fine speech in order not to be late for
a meal; he can leave an intellectual conversation, such as he otherwise values highly, in order
to take his place at the gaming table … If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of
agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from some cause, it is all the same to him
by what kind of representation he is affected. The only thing that concerns him, in order to
decide upon a choice, is how intense, how long, how easily acquired, and how often repeated
this agreeableness is. (5:23; emphasis added)

Reath argues that the passage reveals only Kant’s misguided view that the possibility of
rationally choosing requires a common measure. However, the passage doesn’t seem to
allow this reading. We do not infer a common measure from the need to make a rational
choice, but, rather the other way around: we infer the homogeneity of empirical motiv-
atation exactly from the fact that it is the representation of pleasure that motivates us. The
passage is discussing whether the fact that the objects of different empirical desires
have a source in different faculties of the mind (senses or understanding) can ground a
division between a higher and lower faculty of desire. We learn through these examples
that the source of the representations is irrelevant; motivation is determined by the quan-
tity of pleasure represented, not by the nature of the representation.

The role of pleasure in the determination of choice via empirical motives cannot be
reduced to pleasure merely playing some causal role in the origin of empirical desires.
However, it is important to note that rejecting this part of Reath’s original paper does
not imply rejecting two very important points that Reath makes.

First, accepting a more robust claim that our actions from empirical motives are done
under the guise of the pleasant does not commit Kant to the very implausible view that all
the objects we pursue are pursued as means to pleasure. Just as the guise of the good
view does not imply that everything we pursue we pursue as instrumental means to
the Good, we should not accept a similar conclusion about pleasure in this context.
More precisely, such an interpretation of Kant needs only to say that the connection
between the representation of the object and the feeling of pleasure in the case of non-
moral motives explains why the object of the representation is pursued as an end. As
Reath points out, there is no other possible interpretation of Kant on this matter. The dis-
tinction between the shopkeeper and the ‘sympathetically attuned’ character in the
Groundwork is that the first is ‘impelled (getrieben) to do so through another inclination’
(4:397) – namely, the desire for personal advantage, or a ‘self-seeking purpose’ – while
the latter is moved by an ‘immediate inclination … without any other motive of vanity
or self-interest’ (4:398). This is exactly what makes the latter so much more difficult to distinguish from genuine instances of acting from duty; the dutiful agent and the sympathetically attuned agent share the same end; namely the well-being of others.

Relatedly, we can, and should, also accept another point that Reath makes; namely, that when the agent pursues her happiness constrained by the moral law, she is making a rational choice and pursuing something that is in fact good, and that she correctly represents as such. In the cases in which the agent manifests what Kant calls ‘rational self-love’ (vernünftige Selbstliebe), she acts under the guise of the good in an unproblematic manner. The passage below from the Critique of Practical Reason, for instance, provides strong evidence for this claim:

All the matter of practical rules rests always on subjective conditions, which afford it no universality for rational beings … and they all turn on the principle of one’s own happiness. Now it is indeed undeniable that every volition must also have an object and hence a matter; but the matter is not, just because of this, the determining ground and condition of the maxim … Let the matter be, for example, my own happiness. This, if I attribute it to each … can become an objective law only if I include in it the happiness of others. Thus the law to promote the happiness of others arises … from this: that the form of universality, which reason requires as the condition of giving to a maxim of self-love the objective validity of a law, becomes the determining ground of the will; and so the object … was not the determining ground of the pure will; this was, instead, the mere lawful form alone, by which I limited my maxim based on inclination in order to afford it the universality of a law and in this way to make it suitable for pure practical reason. (5:34–35)

When I give the form of universality to my maxim of self-love by restricting it by the duty to have the happiness of others as my end, I have given ‘the maxim of self-love’ objective validity, and the pursuit of my happiness so restricted is thus good. According to Kant, in limiting ‘my maxim based on inclination in order to afford it the universality of a law’, I ‘make it suitable for pure practical reason’ (5:35). But since the only object of pure practical reason is the good, in pursuing my happiness in this way, I am pursuing the good.11

However, this makes it more difficult to attribute to Kant a guise of the good thesis that extends even to immoral actions. After all immoral actions are exactly the ones in which the pursuit of happiness is not properly restricted by the moral law, and thus cases in which we cannot give the matter of the faculty of desire the form of universality. Moreover, Kant does not think that this is a difficult lesson to learn, or something that we are unlikely to be aware of, and thus perhaps represent as good when in fact it is not. Kant repeatedly affirms that moral cognition is accessible to all, and that we have no difficulty in distinguishing the incentives of morality and self-interest. According to Kant, the ‘most common understanding can distinguish without instruction what form in a maxim makes it fit for a giving of universal law’ (5:27), and that ‘so distinctly and sharply drawn are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the most

11Although I am sympathetic with Ginsborg (1998) that the choice of our nonmoral ends cannot be a rational choice for Kant (if you understand this as making a choice among our inclinations in favour of inclinations that express our identity or something like that), I think passages like this speak against her view that we exercise our rational and free agency only when acting on moral incentives, at least if ‘acting on nonmoral incentives’ means ‘pursuing the objects of our inclinations’. On the other hand, the case of immoral actions, as it will be clear in a moment, is a more vexing question. In the last section I’ll try to show that Ginsborg’s claim, although expressing an important insight, might be incorrect about such cases as well.
common eye cannot fail to distinguish what belongs to one or the other’ (5:36). The evidence above seems to suggest that at least immoral actions are done under the guise of the pleasant rather than the guise of the good. I will not challenge the first part of this claim (‘are done under the guise of the pleasant’) in the coming sections. It is the second half of the claim (‘rather than the guise of the good’) that faces difficulties. Many of the passages that we looked at were from the first chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason. But when we move along to the third chapter, on the incentive of practical reason, or when we look at the discussion of evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the picture is no longer so clear. The respective discussions of self-conceit and perversion shows the second part of the claim to be unsustainable. I’ll argue that in fact these passages lead us to extend the guise of the good to the full scope of human agency. But since I do not think we can reject the claim that immoral actions are done under the guise of the pleasant, the final view turns out to be that the immoral agent, in some way, takes the guise of the pleasant and the guise of the good to be one and the same. This is a deeply incoherent view. The attribution of such a view to an agent is an aspect of Kant’s view that evil action is inscrutable. Or so I’ll argue.

3. Making oneself the determining ground of choice

There is an extensive literature on self-conceit in Kant, and here I mainly aim to draw from it for my purposes rather than to add to it. If the passages we looked at above suggest that the person who acts from self-love is moved by the representation of (the greatest) pleasure alone, the discussion of self-conceit in the Critique of Practical Reason seems to paint a significantly more elaborate picture. First, as suggested above, there is a distinction between the immoral pursuit of self-love (self-conceit) and reasonable self-love. The distinction is put in the following terms:

All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system and the satisfaction of which is called one’s own happiness) constitute regard for oneself (solipsismus). This is either self-regard of love for oneself, a predominant benevolence [Wohlwollen] toward oneself (Philautia), or that of satisfaction [Wohlgefallen] with oneself. The former is called, in particular, self-love; the latter self-conceit. Pure practical reason merely infringes upon self-love, inasmuch as it only restricts it … to the condition of agreement with … [the moral] law, and then it is called rational self-love. (5:73)

Self-conceit does not seem to be merely a tendency to act under the guise of pleasure, but a distinct representation of the incentive of self-love as having a certain worth, not just a propensity to follow the course of the greatest pleasure, but a distorted form of

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12Doubtless, the opacity of our motives to our self-consciousness, the possibility of self-deception, the complexities of moral judgment involved in pursuing the duties of virtue, and the very fact that morality and self-interest often coincide, all conspire to make it difficult to determine in particular cases whether we acted from duty or not. This has important consequences for our understanding of the duty of conscience and other issues in Kant’s philosophy (more on this below). But the fact remains that these are radically distinct motives on Kant’s views.

13When I pursue an immoral action, and reason determines that some other action is a necessary means to my immoral end, then it seems that I pursue the instrumental action under the guise of the good, even though the good in this case is only conditionally good (or as the Collins lecture calls it in the passage above ‘bonitas problematica’). Although I think this is roughly the correct view, the status of the hypothetical imperative with relation to immoral action is a rather controversial matter, so I’ll leave this issue aside.

14For a recent contribution, see Russell (2020).
self-evaluation.\textsuperscript{15} Self-conceit embodies an illusion \textit{(Wahn)} (5:75), and thus there must be some kind of \textit{mistaken} representation involved in self-conceit. These passages might give the impression that self-conceit is not a principle of action, but rather merely a sympathetic representation of ourselves, which brings us some kind of contentment when we act from self-love. But this impression can be easily dispelled by Kant’s further explanation of self-conceit a few paragraphs later:

This propensity to make oneself, as having subjective determining grounds of choice, into the objective determining ground of the will in general can be called \textit{self-love}; and if self-love \textit{makes itself lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle}, it can be called \textit{self-conceit}. (5:74; second emphasis added)

If self-conceit is self-love making itself lawgiving and an unconditional practical principle, then it must be a determining ground of choice, and thus a principle of action. If self-conceit makes self-love as ‘the unconditional practical principle’, then it must represent actions from self-love as the unconditional objects of practical reason. But we know that the good is the only object of practical reason, and thus self-conceit must be a form of representing our happiness (the object of self-love) as good, and thus the actions that manifest self-conceit must be performed under the guise of the good. Given that these actions are not good, and that one’s happiness is only good when conditioned by virtue, self-conceit embodies a mistake; thus, it does indeed manifest an illusion. So immoral actions that manifest self-conceit seem also to be performed under the guise of the good. But does every immoral action, every evil action, manifest self-conceit? Perhaps it is just a subset of the immoral actions that are performed under the guise of good, those that manifest some special kind of ‘self-satisfaction’ with oneself.

In the \textit{Religion}, Kant has a famous extended discussion of evil dispositions and evil agency that seems to imply that self-conceit is present in every instance of immoral agency. First, ‘genuine evil consists in our \textit{will} not to resist the inclinations’; evil is to be ‘sought not in his inclinations but in his perverted maxims, and hence in freedom itself’ (Kant 1998, 6:59n). The perverted maxim, described here as a manifestation of free choice, is the inversion of the order of incentives that Kant describes as the original choice of evil earlier in the \textit{Religion}. The moral law is the condition of the worthiness of being happy and thus self-love should govern one’s agency only insofar as constrained by the moral law. Moral agency subordinates self-love to the moral law. Evil consists in inverting this order, in subordinating the moral incentive to the incentive of moral law:

the human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the order of incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. ... Since ... he realizes that that the two [incentives] cannot stand on an equal footing, but one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law. (6:36)

\textsuperscript{15}There is a dispute among Kant scholars whether self-conceit should be viewed primarily as an intrapersonal (a failure of self-assessment) or interpersonal (a failure of assessing oneself in relation to others) phenomenon; I’ll focus more on the former aspect, but my views do not depend on the dispute. See Moran (2014) for an example of the former view and Reath (1989) for an example of the latter. For an interesting middle position, see Russell (2020). There is a somewhat similar debate about the origin of evil, whether it is grounded on a human being’s unsocial sociability or whether we should understand the origin of evil in human nature apart from the social context (Wood (2010) for an example of the former view. For the latter, see Grenberg (2010) and Allison (2002). Similarly, I’ll focus on the adoption of evil maxims in abstraction of its social context, but my views do not depend on taking a stance on this issue).
In other words, the human being, insofar as she is evil, represents the object of self-love (the agent’s happiness) as ‘the unconditional principle of the power of choice’ (6:45n); that is, as the unconditioned object of practical reason, and thus as good. Indeed Kant argues that the original propensity to evil is a propensity to a self-imposed illusion.\(^\text{16}\)

Any profession of reverence for the moral law which in its maxims does not however grant to the law … preponderance over all other determining grounds of the power of choice is hypocritical, and the propensity to it is inward deceit … wherefore the Bible too … calls the author of evil … the Liar from the beginning, and thus characterizes the human being as regards what seems to be the main ground of evil in him. (6:42n)

However, Kant also distinguishes in the *Religion* between three forms of the propensity to evil in human nature: frailty, impurity, and depravity. It seems that only the highest grade of the propensity involves the inversion of the incentives discussed above, as it is described as the ‘propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of moral law to others’ (6:30). On the other hand, impurity of the ‘human heart’ consists merely in its not having ‘adopted the law alone as sufficient incentive’ (6:30), while frailty of human nature consists in the fact that even though ‘I incorporate the good (the law) into the maxim of my power of choice’, the moral motive is the weaker incentive ‘whenever the maxim is to be followed’.

Understanding the three grades (*Stufen*) of evil, and its relation to the choice of the grounding maxim of evil, the maxim that inverts the order of incentives, is a difficult undertaking. My own view is that none of the grades of evil correspond to the adoption of this maxim, but they represent the gradual manifestation in the phenomenal world of the timeless adoption of an evil disposition. These propensities represent the gradual corruption of the human heart that is ultimately grounded, insofar as it is imputable, in reversing the order of the incentives. I think this is confirmed by the passage just after Kant describes the three grades of evil, in which Kant disambiguates two senses of ‘deed’ in explaining how a propensity that precedes every deed (the kind of propensity that the three degrees of evil are instances of) could ‘attach to the moral faculty of choice’, given that, ‘nothing is … evil but that which is our own deed’ (6:31). However, according to Kant, ‘deed’ (*Tat*) has ‘two different meanings’:

The term ‘deed’ can apply just as well to the use of freedom through which the supreme maxim (either in favour or against the law) … in the power of choice, as the use by which actions themselves are performed according to that maxim. The propensity of evil is a deed in the first meaning … and at the same time the formal ground of every deed contrary to the law according to the second meaning. (ibid)

But even if one disagrees with the details of the reading I propose, the quote above shows that the maxim that inverts the order of the incentives must be somehow the formal ground of every immoral action, and thus every immoral action must somehow be grounded on the illusion that represents our happiness as good even when not constrained by the moral law. So, I think we can conclude that Kant is committed to the guise of the good thesis in its full generality.

However, there is nothing in the discussion of self-conceit and evil that directly challenges or revises the discussion of immoral action in the first chapter of the *Critique of...

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\(^{16}\)For a detailed discussion of the relation between evil and self-deception in Kant, see Papish (2018).
Practical Reason, or in the other passages we discussed in the previous section. But this raises some important questions. First, why would we need to assume that these actions are also done under the guise of the good and not just under the guise of the pleasant? How can actions even be done under both these guises? Moreover, why should we attribute this kind of illusion to a human agent, when we have an apparently sufficient explanation of these actions in terms of pursuit of pleasure? And, closely connected to this question, how can human reason make such a massive error? If the difference between morality and happiness is so clear to ordinary reason, how can it get entangled into a representation of unconstrained self-love as having exactly the essential characteristic of the moral law; namely, unconditional necessity? I hope to answer these questions in the next section.

4. Incorporation and evil

Let us start with what we may call the ‘naive picture’ of nonmoral action. On the naive picture, when the agent acts from nonmoral motives, she is simply moved by her desires rather than the representation of moral law. If we add Kant’s commitment to hedonism to this naive picture, we come to the conclusion that immoral actions are effected from the representation of pleasure; on this picture, the agent is moved simply by the representation associated with the greatest quantity of pleasure. This seems very close to the picture we were arriving at the end of section two, but as many interpreters note, this picture seems to make immoral action an expression of an heteronomous aspect of choice unconnected to the autonomy of our will. The agent in this picture seems not to freely choose to act immorally, but rather be dragged by the forces of inclination without any intervention of a free power of choice. Thus most interpreters follow Allison (1990) in taking this passage from the Religion, in which Kant puts forward what Allison dubs ‘the Incorporation Thesis’, to count against the naive reading:

Freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through an incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself); only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom). (6:24)

There is a reading of the role of the Incorporation Thesis that is accepted by a number of interpreters, that seems to provide us with a simple explanation of why Kant is committed to the guise of the good in the fullest extent. On this reading, an agent endowed with a rational faculty of desire can only act by first formulating a principle of action (a ‘universal rule’). A rational agent cannot be merely pushed by a desire, but needs to find a justification for being guided by such a desire, and must actively endorse or accept what desire offers as an object for choice. This is best seen, perhaps,
from the point of view of deliberation: in deliberating, a self-conscious agent can ask herself why she is choosing an action. If the answer is ‘because it gives me pleasure’, she can now ask herself why she should pursue what gives her pleasure. At some point, she will need to formulate a principle that justifies her action; at the very least, she will need to accept a principle like ‘I should always pursue what gives me pleasure’, or even something like ‘I should pursue what maximizes utility’. Since she is moved by her reflective, rational capacities, she cannot just let her desires move her; she must choose an act that she takes to be universally valid. At best, an agent can choose to act on the principle ‘I will follow whatever desire is the strongest at the moment of the action’; desires cannot simply move us without our taking them, at least implicitly, to be worthy of pursuit, or, in other words, good.

Now particular proponents of such a reading might take issue with some aspects of what I described here, but this way of putting it will make easy to see the obstacles for any such reading.\textsuperscript{19} Ultimately, I think this reading should be rejected and thus that we cannot explain Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good in its fullest extent this way. However, I will not claim to have refuted any version of this reading of the Incorporation Thesis; here, I mostly want to motivate an alternative view.

Let us start by noticing that this reading seems to immediately conflict with Kant’s hedonism as presented in section two. It seems that the principle ‘pursue the greatest happiness’ or ‘pursue a maximum of pleasure’ is only one of the many termini that an immoral agent could find for their moral reasoning. That is, other universal rules such as ‘maximize honour’, ‘never leave any family blood unavenged’, would be equally candidates to be the universal rule to be adopted. One could try to argue that these are not very plausible universal principles, but neither are any principles other than the moral law – not even the principle of happiness. Again, Kant is insistent that even the most ordinary reason can tell the difference between happiness and morality:

The most common understanding can distinguish without instruction what form what form in a maxim makes it fit for a giving of universal law and what does not. (5:27; emphasis added)

So it seems that the ‘most common understanding’ would have no problem understanding that the principle of happiness is not fit to be a universal law, and thus its apparent plausibility cannot be the difference between this principle and other candidate principles to replace the moral law as reason’s purported universal principle when we act immorally.

But, perhaps more importantly, this reading of the Incorporation Thesis also inverts the \textit{ratio cognoscendi} between freedom and the moral law. In the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, Kant famously says that the moral law is the \textit{ratio cognoscendi} of freedom; that is, we are first aware of our freedom through our awareness of the moral law as obligating us. As Kant says, ‘had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom’ (5:4n). Scholars disagree whether Kant’s views in \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} on this issue are compatible with his earlier views in the \textit{Groundwork}, but there is no question that he

\textsuperscript{19}Reath (2015) puts forward an interpretation of Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good that puts less emphasis on the deliberative perspective, but instead focuses on the internal principles of rational willing. As such, it comes closer to the interpretation of Kant that I propose below. However, I think that Reath’s understanding of the ‘condition of universal validity’ (253) for rational willing also faces the problems I raise below. It is worth noting that Reath thinks that his reading of Kant is not mandated by the text, but compatible with it.
holds the same view when he puts forward the Incorporation Thesis in the *Religion*. In fact, we find stark endorsements of the view at various junctures:

> Were this [moral] law not given to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning on our part would produce it or win our power of choice over to it. Yet this law is the only law that makes us conscious of the independence of our power of choice from determination of all other incentives (of our freedom). (6:26n)

> We can quickly be convinced that the concept of freedom of the power of choice does not precede in us the consciousness of the moral law but is only inferred from the determinability of our power of choice thought this law as unconditional command. We have only to ask whether we are certainly and immediately conscious of a faculty enabling us to overcome, by firm resolve, every incentive to transgression ... Everybody must admit that *he does not* know whether ... he would not waive in his resolve. (6:49n)

Kant is very explicit in the passage that introduces the Incorporation Thesis that the thesis expresses a ‘characteristic [that is] entirely peculiar’ to a free power of choice. We know that the Incorporation Thesis applies to us only insofar as we know that we are free. Thus our only avenue towards the conclusion that the Incorporation Thesis applies to us is through the awareness of the moral law. But this seems entirely foreign to the understanding of the Incorporation Thesis provided by the standard reading. For it seems to imply that we can accept the truth of the Incorporation Thesis just by contemplating the rational choice even among the competing claims of different inclinations; it seems to be the consequence of being capable to make use of one’s rational faculties in any practical way. Although one might find this picture plausible as a more general picture of rational agency, it does not seem to be Kant’s view, at least by the time he puts forward the Incorporation Thesis.

So our path to understanding Kant’s seeming acceptance of a more extended version of the guise of the good thesis should not depend on this interpretation of the Incorporation Thesis. However, I think it is right that the Incorporation Thesis does help explain Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good thesis even for the case of immoral actions. Let us step back for a moment and think about a more skeptical view about evil, the Socratic view that no one willingly pursues evil. On this view, an evil action is always done from ignorance, and it is never a manifestation of the agent’s freedom. Kant clearly rejects this view, though we can see from our discussion above that it is not that simple for Kant to reject it; the dualism of motives seems to push Kant in the direction that immoral action is of a very different character than moral action. So we might ask, on what grounds does Kant reject the Socratic view? Why would Kant reject that immoral actions are never free, the idea that we are only free insofar as we act well? Of course, one might think, it is obvious enough that there are free immoral actions; Kant does not want to deny what any observer of human affairs can see. However, it is not clear that Kant should be so keen to accept this kind of empirical case for the widespread presence of clear-eyed evil in the world; it is not clear that such a stance is compatible with his view that in examining the worth of our actions ‘what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see’ (*Groundwork*, 4:407). Another possibility is suggested by the standard...
reading of the Incorporation Thesis: it is a general fact about our rational capacities that we must stand behind a desire in order for the desire to play any role in the motivation of action. But, as I have just argued, we have good reasons to be skeptical of the standard reading.

However, if we keep in mind the epistemic priority of the moral law, the obvious answer to these questions is that we know that we freely pursue evil simply by being aware of the moral law even in cases in which we flouted its commands. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant explains the epistemic priority of awareness of the moral law as follows:

But ask … [someone] whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of … immediate execution, that he give false testimony against an honourable man … He would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes (erkennt) freedom, which, without the moral law would have remained unknown to him. (5:30)

The subject in the example cognizes freedom, the capacity to act independently from empirical motives, from his awareness that he ought to refuse the prince’s command; in this manner, he cognizes that his action, no matter what he does, is an exercise of this capacity, whether or not he does what he ought to do. If the subject, out of fear, does what the prince commands, he is doing so instead of acting from duty, while fully aware that he could be refraining from doing exactly what he’s doing. But the same prospective and contemporary awareness of the moral law is present in our retrospective awareness of actions we performed in contravention of the moral law. Thus, we know that evil is a manifestation of freedom because evil is imputable; that is, evil is the exercise of the capacity to act from duty. Now, it is common ground among commentators that the fact that evil must be imputable is an important motivation for Kant’s views. But a certain understanding of the Incorporation Thesis inverts the ratio cognoscendi of our awareness of imputability and our awareness that evil actions are free. Just as our awareness of the moral law is epistemically prior to our awareness of our freedom, our awareness of imputability must be epistemically prior to our awareness of the possibility of free evil actions: we know that immoral actions are free because we know that immoral actions are imputable (because we know that we ought not to have performed them), not the other way around. So the guise of the good thesis must extend to immoral actions, because imputability implies that evil actions are manifestations of freedom. And since freedom is nothing but reason’s capacity to be practical on its own, freedom is nothing but the capacity to act from the representation of the necessity of a certain action.23

Since we saw above that the good is the necessary object of the faculty of desire, freedom is the capacity to act from the representation of the good. Thus immoral action, insofar as it is imputable, must be an action determined by a representation of the action as good.

22Of course, in the *Religion*, Kant also says that we do not need a formal proof of a propensity for evil ‘in view of the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us’ (6:32–33), so there is also textual evidence in favour of Wood’s reading. My own view is that experience can parade evil in front of us only after we learned of the possibility of evil in the manner explained below. At any rate, this passage needs to be reconciled with Kant’s more general views about the opacity of human motives. On this topic see Ware (2009) and Berg (2020).

23I develop these points in more detail in Tenenbaum (2019).
This, however, does not contradict Kant’s commitment to hedonism; the choice under the guise of the pleasant is also a choice under the guise of the good. Since, of course, I cannot obey two sovereigns simultaneously unless they command the same thing, immoral action must be one in which the agent takes the guise of the pleasant and the guise of the good to be one and the same. This should not surprise us if we look back at our definition of self-conceit. Again, according to Kant ‘the propensity to make oneself, as having subjective determining ground of choice, the objective ground of the will in general can be called self-love’, and it becomes self-conceit, when ‘self-love makes itself … the unconditional principle of the will’ (5:74). Since Kant defines pleasure as the ‘representation of the agreement of an object with the subjective conditions of life’, and life is ‘the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire’ (5:9n), to act from self-conceit, to invert the order of the incentives, is to take pleasure to be a necessary (that is, unconditional) object of the will. But the necessary object of the will, of practical reason, is, again, the good. Thus self-conceit can also be represented as taking the pleasant to be the good as such.

Of course, we seem to be still left with the mystery of how someone could make this mistake. However, we are not ascribing this form of thought on the basis of learning from experience, or otherwise, that people reason in this manner, or because we find them (implicitly or explicitly) providing this answer to a question about why they acted the way they did. We learn about this possibility instead by learning that we act as we ought not to, and thus that we exercised our power to act from the representation of the good in the unconstrained pursuit of the pleasant. What we learn through the experience of our immoral actions is ultimately inscrutable and Kant makes it clear in the Religion that the choice of evil cannot be explained:

> Evil can have originated only from moral evil (not just from the limitations of our nature); yet the original predisposition … is a predisposition to the good; there is no conceivable ground for us, therefore, from which moral evil could first have come in us. Scriptures express this incomprehensibility in a historical narrative … by projecting evil at the beginning of the world, not, however, within the human being, but in a spirit of an originally more sublime destiny. The absolutely first beginning of all evil is thereby represented as incomprehensible (for whence the evil in that spirit?). (6:43–44)

In other words, since evil, insofar as it is imputable, is a manifestation of a capacity to act in the pursuit of what is unconditionally good, it must be a failed exercise of this capacity—an exercise of the capacity in opposition to its constitutive principle. However, it is important to note that it is a peculiar kind of failure, a failed exercise of which no explanation is possible. There is nothing difficult in understanding that certain capacities can be poorly exercised: my capacity to drive might be poorly exercised because it was poorly developed, or because of external impediments, or because I was distracted. But generally we understand these failures by understanding what interfered with the capacity. But evil is an improper exercise of the power of choice that cannot be attributed to any external impediments; it must be attributed to nothing but the exercise of the capacity itself. And this is what makes it inscrutable.

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24Kant also sometimes describes the choice of a good maxim as inexplicable. But here there is a different sense of ‘inexplicable’. Since this is reason’s self-determination according to an unconditional principle, there can be no further explanation of this act. As Kant says in the deduction in the Critique of Practical Reason: ‘All human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at basic powers or faculties’ (5:46).
5. Conclusion

In this paper I have defended the view that Kant’s commitment to the guise of the good thesis extends to all manifestations of agency. This in principle reinforces a common view among interpreters that the rational form is not only present in moral actions, but it manifests itself in every single act of a human being. But it turns out that the grounds for attributing to Kant this commitment in the case of immoral action is significantly more complex than commentators have assumed. In particular, we cannot simply move from the incorporation thesis, or considerations about the intelligibility of rational action, directly to this conclusion; it is instead our awareness of the moral law, our awareness of the moral imperative even when we deviate from it, that forces us to conclude that we represent our immoral actions as good. Commitment to the view that the guise of the good applies to any instance of human agency, and to the pursuit of any of our ends, is ultimately grounded on our awareness of the moral law, not on the structure of a more general form of rational deliberation. In fact, if anything, it turns out to be rather paradoxical that the end of immoral action is conceived under the guise of the good; it implies that an action is performed at the same time under the guise of the pleasant and under the guise of the good. In other words, extending the guise of the good thesis to immoral actions so that they can be imputed to our free agency amounts to understanding these actions as essentially inscrutable.

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References


I am in agreement with Reath (2015) that it would be a mistake to accommodate bad action by attributing to Kant what Reath calls the ‘elective conception of choice [Willkür].’ The elective conception treats choice as capacity that can choose according to practical reasoning or against it. But, as Reath points out, Kant clearly thinks that choosing evil is a failed exercise of the capacity, and the ‘ability’ to choose evil is, according to Kant, an ‘incapacity’ [Unvermögen] [Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 227].


